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DILEMMA v. PARADOX: VALUATION
OF AN ADVANCED DEGREE UPON
DISSOLUTION OF A MARRIAGE
LEONARD L. LOEB*
MARY K. MCCANN**
I. THE DILEMMA
As a result of the reform of the divorce laws across the
nation, the element of no fault is available in all but two
jurisdictions.' Consequently, courts now focus their atten-
tion on the economic aspects of divorce and have broadened
the definition of marital property to include such things as
pension plans,2 stock options 3  annuities4 and other in-
tangibles. 5 A recent economic controversy over which courts
have split, even within the same state,6 is whether a profes-
sional degree or license is property and thus subject to divi-
sion upon dissolution of a marriage. This legal problem has
* B.B.A., University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1950; J.D., University of Wisconsin,
Madison, 1952; Law Offices of Leonard L. Loeb, S.C., Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
** B.A., University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1967; M.S., University of Wisconsin,
Madison, 1970; J.D., Marquette University Law School, 1981; associate with the Law
Offices of Leonard L. Loeb, S.C., Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
The authors wish to thank Joseph R. Wall for his assistance in the research for this
article.
1. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 401 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982); S.D. CODIFIED LAws
ANN. § 25-4-2 (1982).
2. See, e.g., Leighton v. Leighton, 81 Wis. 2d 620, 634-35, 261 N.W.2d 457, 463-
64 (1978).
3. See, e.g., Ettinger v. Ettinger, 637 P.2d 63 (Okla. 1981) (stock options not prop-
erty to be divided).
4. See, e.g., Daniels v. Retirement Bd. of the Policeman's Annuity & Benefit
Fund, 106 Ill. App. 3d 412, 435 N.E.2d 1276 (1982).
5. See Amett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974). Dissenting in this case, Justice
Marshall observed that: "The decisions of this Court have given constitutional recog-
nition to the fact that in our complex modem society, wealth and property take many
forms. We have said that property interests requiring constitutional protection 'ex-
tend well beyond actual ownership of real estate, chattels, or money."' Id. at 207-08
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnote and citations omitted). In the same case he noted
that "today more and more of our wealth takes the form of rights or status rather than
of tangible goods.... A profession or job is frequently far more valuable than a
house or bank account... ." Id. at 207 n.2 (quoting Reich, The New Property, 73
YALE L.J. 733, 738 (1964)).
6. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 49-61.
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arisen in both community property7 and equitable distribu-
tion 8 states, where courts have been confronted with the
problem of how to fairly compensate a spouse who has sup-
ported the other while he or she obtains a postgraduate
degree.
The typical fact pattern involves a wife who was the prin-
cipal breadwinner during the time of the husband's profes-
sional education or training.9 All of the couple's efforts were
devoted to the education of the husband. After he obtains
his advanced degree but before the family can benefit from
7. Four community property states, California, Idaho, Louisiana and New Mex-
ico, provide for an equal division of property. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5104 (West 1970);
IDAHO CODE § 32-906 (Supp. 1982); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2335 (West Supp.
1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-8B (1978).
The remaining community property states, Arizona, Nevada, Texas and Washing-
ton, provide for an "equitable" but not necessarily equal division. ARiz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 25-211 (1976); NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.220 (1979); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 5.01(b) (Vernon 1975); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.16.030 (Supp. 1982).
8. Thirty-nine states can be termed "equitable distribution" states: ALA. CODE
§ 30-4-19 (Supp. 1982); ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.210(6) (1975 & Supp. 1982); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 34-1214 (Supp. 1981); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-113(l) (1973 & Supp.
1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. §46b-81(a) (Supp. 1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13,
§ 1513(a) (1974); FLA. STAT. § 61.14 (1975 & Supp. 1983); GA. CODE § 30-105 (1967
& Supp. 1982); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 580-47(a) (Supp. 1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40,
§ 503(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982); IND. CODE § 31-1-11.5-11(b) (West 1982); IowA
CODE ANN. § 598.21 (West 1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(d) (Supp. 1981); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.190(1) (Baldwin Supp. 1981); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19,
§ 7221-IA(l) (1981); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 1(1981); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 208, § 34 (West Supp. 1982-1983); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.23(l) (Supp.
1982-1983); MINN. STAT. § 518.58 (Supp. 1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452-330.1 (Vernon
Supp. 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 48-321(1) (Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-365
(1978); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458.19 (1968); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A-34-23 (West
Supp. 1982-1983); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236 (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 50.20 (1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-24 (1981); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3105.18 (Page 1980); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1278 (Supp. 1982-1983); OR. REV.
STAT. § 107.105(1)(c) (1981-1982); 21-23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 23-401(d) (Purdon
Supp. 1982-1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16 (Supp. 1982); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 25-4-44 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-825 (1977); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(1)
(Supp. 1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 751 (Supp. 1982); VA. CODE § 20-107.3 (Supp.
1982); Wis. STAT. § 767.255 (1981-1982); Wyo. STAT. § 20-2-114 (1977).
The remaining three states are strict title states where property is awarded on the
basis of the name or names on the title. Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-5-23 (Supp. 1982);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-130 (Law Co-op 1976); W. VA. CODE § 48-2-16 (1980).
9. No reported cases could be found in which a husband claimed an interest in a
wife's advanced degree or license. But see Scislowicz v. Scislowicz, No. 80-1744 (Wis.
Ct App Sept. 15, 1981) (available Feb. 16, 1983, on LEXIS, Wis library, Ct. App. file)
(unpublished decision) (where the court refused to grant the husband an interest in
the increased earning ability of the wife he had helped put through law school).
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the fruits of its endeavors, the marriage breaks up. Fre-
quently there are no children, so child support is not in-
volved. Even if child support is involved, a substantial
portion of the wife's economic resources will be used for
child care costs. Moreover, no tangible assets of any sub-
stantial value have been accumulated, since all of the
couple's financial resources have gone into the husband's ed-
ucation. Consequently, there is little or no property subject
to distribution upon dissolution. Meanwhile, the wife has
foregone her own career goals and education in expectation
of a higher standard of living in the future based upon her
husband's training.
Thus, the timing of the divorce triggers a compensation
problem regarding the supporting spouse in this situation.
The traditional awards of a divorce court consist of property
division and maintenance. When the divorce occurs many
years after the husband has obtained his professional degree,
these traditional means may be adequate to compensate the
wife. Then the marital estate will usually consist of a sub-
stantial accumulation of assets. The husband will have an
established practice or profession with an ascertainable in-
come. The wife will realize a return on her investment by an
appropriate award of the couple's accumulated assets in the
property division and a maintenance award based on her
husband's increased earning capacity.
When a marriage breaks up soon after the supported
spouse obtains his degree or license, a different problem
arises: how is the supporting spouse to be compensated for
her foregone opportunities and loss of investment? In recent
years supporting spouses have asserted claims on their part-
ners' degrees on the theory that the degree is an asset of the
marriage and thus subject to division or that she is entitled
to reimbursement for her financial contributions towards its
attainment. As the following discussion will show, the an-
swer as to how successful such claims will be is still
unsettled.
II. Is THE SPOUSE'S PROFESSIONAL DEGREE OR LICENSE
MARITAL PROPERTY SUBJECT TO DISTRIBUTION?
Generally, community property and equitable distribu-
tion statutes provide that property legally and beneficially
1983]
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acquired during the marriage is subject to distribution upon
dissolution of the marriage. 10 How a jurisdiction defines
property determines whether a professional degree or license
is an asset includable in or excludable from the marital es-
tate. Appellate courts in at least nineteen states" have now
confronted the issue of whether to divide the fruits of the
professional degree with differing results.
A. Community Property States
1. California
The community property state of California appears to
be holding fast to the position that a professional degree is
not property. In 1969 in Todd v. Todd 2 a wife had worked
to supplement her husband's veterans' benefits to put him
through college and law school during their twenty-year
marriage. The California Court of Appeal decided that a
legal education was not community property and affirmed
the trial court holding that there was no value to a legal edu-
cation as a claimed marital asset.' 3 The Todd court's chief
concern seemed to be that it would be too difficult to value
such a degree: "At best, education is an intangible property
right, the value of which, because of its character, cannot
10. See supra notes 7 & 8.
11. See, e.g., Wisner v. Wisner, 129 Ariz. 333, 631 P.2d 115 (Ct. App. 1981); Todd
v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1969); In re Marriage of Graham,
194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978); In re Marriage of Goldstein, 97 In. App. 3d 1023,
423 N.E.2d 1201 (1981); In re Marriage of McManama, 399 N.E.2d 371 (Ind. 1980);
In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978); Leveck v. Leveck, 614
S.W.2d 710 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981); Moss v. Moss, 80 Mich. App. 693, 264 N.W.2d 97
(1978); DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755 (Minn. 1981); In re Marriage of
Vanet, 544 S.W.2d 236 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Wheeler v. Wheeler, 193 Neb. 615, 228
N.W.2d 594 (1975); Stem v. Stem, 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257 (1975); Muckleroy v.
Muckleroy, 84 N.M. 14,498 P.2d 1357 (1972); Lesman v. Lesman, 88 A.D.2d 153, 452
N.Y.S.2d 935 (1982); Hegge v. Hegge, 236 N.W.2d 910 (N.D. 1975); Lira v. Lira, 88
Ohio App. 2d 164, 428 N.E.2d 445 (1980); Diment v. Diment, 531 P.2d 1071 (Okla.
Ct. App. 1974); Frausto v. Frausto, 611 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980); Lundberg
v. Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d 1, 318 N.W.2d 918 (1982).
See also, e.g., lower court opinions in Zahler v. Zahler, 8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA)
2694 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 5, 1982); Reen v. Reen, 8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2193
(Mass. Prob. & Fam. Ct. 1981).
12. 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1969).
13. Id. at _, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 135.
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have a monetary value placed upon it for division between
spouses."' 4
Ten years later in In re Marriage ofAufmuth , 5 the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal again refused to denominate the de-
gree community property, this time on the theory that to do
so would be to divide postdivorce earnings:
The value of a legal education lies in the potential for
increase in the future earning capacity of the acquiring
spouse made possible by the law degree and innumerable
other factors and conditions which contribute to the devel-
opment of a successful law practice. A determination that
such an "asset" is community property would require a di-
vision of post-dissolution earnings to the extent that they
are attributable to the law degree, even though such earn-
ings are by definition the separate property of the acquiring
spouse.. .... "Since the philosophy of the community
property system is that a community interest can be ac-
quired only during the time of the marriage, it would then
be inconsistent with that philosophy to assign to any com-
munity interest the value of the post-marital efforts to
either spouse."'16
A recent California case, Sullivan v. Sullivan,' 7 which is
still being litigated, 8 has had a tortuous journey through the
California court system. On the first appeal 19 the court held
that the degree could be considered property since there was
no valid distinction between a degree and a closely held cor-
poration.20 On a second appeal2 ' the court rejected this
holding, explaining that for something to be defined as prop-
erty, it must have certain attributes such as the potential for
being transferred, shared with others or passed on after
death. No professional education has any of these attrib-
utes.2 Thus, California has not yet found reason to reject its
initial holding in Todd.
14. Id.
15. 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1979).
16. Id. at - 152 Cal. Rptr. at 678 (quoting Fortier v. Fortier, 34 Cal. App. 3d
384, 388, 109 Cal. Rptr. 915, 918 (1973)).
17. 27 Cal. App. 3d 656, (unpublished) vacated, 134 Cal. App. 3d 634, 184 Cal.
Rptr. 796 (1982).
18. No. LA-31-653 (Cal. Sup. Ct. argued Feb. 8, 1983).
19. Sullivan, 27 Cal. App. 3d 656.
20. Id.
21. Sullivan, 134 Cal. App. 3d 634, 184 Cal. Rptr. 796.
22. Id. at _ 184 Cal. Rptr. at 800.
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2. Texas
A wife's attempt to have the court divide the medical ed-
ucation of her husband fared no better in the Court of Civil
Appeals of Texas. In Frausto v. Frausto23 the trial court or-
dered a $20,000 payment as reimbursement for "Petitioner's
share of the community expense for Respondent's educa-
tion."24 In 1981 the higher court reversed and stated: "We
hold that a professional education acquired during marriage
is not a property right and is not divisible upon divorce. 25
While recognizing that a trial court has equitable powers to
consider many factors, the opinion conceded that "the trial
court is limited by our basic community property laws. 26
The court would not countenance a restitutionary award
either, reasoning that the education had been financed with
community funds and that restitution is appropriate only
when separate property has been contributed or when com-
munity funds have been used to enhance separate property.
Here, the degree or education was not considered to be prop-
erty. Moreover, Mrs. Frausto had filed no pleadings seeking
reimbursement, so the award of $20,000 was denied.27
3. New Mexico and Arizona
A third community property state, New Mexico, arrived
at a similar result in Muckleroy v. Muckleroy, 28 where the
debts of a physician and his wife exceeded their assets. That
court said that while "the right to engage in a licensed pro-
fession is a protected property right . . . not all property
rights are property within the meaning of the community
property statutes. ' 29 Thus, the court stated:
We believe that in order for a medical license to become
community property, it must possess the attribute of joint
ownership. A medical license is only a permit issued by
the controlling authority of the State, authorizing the indi-
vidual licensee to engage in the practice of medicine. The
23. 611 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).
24. Id. at 657 n.l.
25. Id. at 659.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 660.
28. 84 N.M. 14, 498 P.2d 1357 (1972).
29. Id. at _, 498 P.2d at 1358.
[Vol. 66:495
DEGREE VALUATION IN DIVORCE
medical license may be used and enjoyed by the licensee as
a means of earning a livelihood, but it is not community
property because it cannot be the subject of joint owner-
ship. We hold, therefore, that for purposes of the commu-
nity property laws of the State of New Mexico, a medical
license is not community property.3 °
The wife was also denied the fifteen percent of Dr. Muckler-
oy's future earnings which she was seeking.3'
Almost ten years later the Arizona Court of Appeals re-
lied on Muckleroy to reject the property concept in regard to
a medical degree in Wisner v. Wisner.32 Unlike the New
Mexico court, however, the Arizona court added that "while
an education is not property subject to division, it is still a
factor to be considered, in addition to others, in arriving at
an equitable property division and in determining matters of
spousal maintenance and child support. ' 33 Noting that the
Wisners had been married for fifteen years, the court said
that "an important factor to consider in the overall picture is
the extent to which the non-license or degree holder has al-
ready or otherwise benefited financially during coverture
from his or her spouse's earning capacity. 34 In this case the
wife benefited from the fruits of her husband's education by
way of the property settlement and maintenance award in
addition to the higher standard of living enjoyed during the
latter years of the marriage. The court also rejected the
wife's unjust enrichment theory, deeming it inappropriate as
applied to a marriage unless such an agreement had been
memorialized in a formal contract.35
B. Equitable Distribution States
Equitable distribution states appear to have a more flex-
ible approach to the issue of whether the value of an educa-
tion is distributable. Yet, the vast majority of these
jurisdictions refuse to call the license or degree "marital
property." Most will, however, take it into consideration if
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. 129 Ariz. 333, 631 P.2d 115 (Ct. App. 1981).
33. Id. at __ 631 P.2d at 122.
34. Id. at , 631 P.2d at 123.
35. Id.
1983]
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there are other assets to divide and in a low asset or no asset
case will use it as a factor in setting a level of maintenance.
1. Iowa
The highest court in only one state - Iowa - has held
that an education is an asset capable of being distributed in a
property settlement. In In re Marriage of Horstmann36 the
wife dropped out of college and both she and her parents
financed the husband's legal education. 7 At the time of trial
the couple had one child and virtually no assets. The hus-
band was ordered to pay $18,000 in installments as a prop-
erty settlement along with child support and token
alimony.3 8 The supreme court upheld this award, explaining
that:
[Tihe law degree from Drake University and the certificate
of admission to practice law in the courts of this state do
not themselves constitute an asset of the parties for court
consideration in making distribution upon dissolution of
the marriage. However, it is the potential for increase in
future earning capacity made possible by the law degree
and certificate of admission conferred upon the husband
with the aid of his wife's efforts which constitutes the asset
for distribution by the court. 9
2. Ohio
The Horstmann opinion relied heavily on Daniels v. Dan-
iels,40 where the Ohio Court of Appeals took the position
that a professional degree is marital property.4' The Daniels
were married while both were students in college. The wife
completed her undergraduate education and had a child
during the seven-year marriage while the husband went on
36. 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978). See also Comment, Horstmann v. Horstmann:
Present Right to Practice a Profession as Marital Propery, 56 DEN. L.J. 677 (1979);
Comment, Professional Education as a Divisible Asset in Marriage Dissolutions, 64
IOWA L. REv. 705 (1979); Note, Divorce After Professional School: Education and Fu-
ture Earning Capacity May Be Marital Properly, 44 Mo. L. REV. 329 (1979) (analyses
of Horstmann).
37. 263 N.W.2d at 889.
38. Id. at 886.
39. Id. at 891.
40. 20 Ohio App. 2d 458, 185 N.E.2d 773 (1961).
41. Id. at , 185 N.E.2d at 775.
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to obtain a medical degree. Both contributed approximately
equal amounts of their earnings to the support of the family.
The wife's father also gave sizeable sums to the household.
The marriage broke up as the husband was beginning his
residency in obstetrics and gynecology.4 2 The Daniels court
upheld an award to the wife of $24,000 in "property settle-
ment alimony," which under Ohio law is actually a distribu-
tion of marital assets and liabilities.43 The court concluded
that the degree was the principal asset of the parties and
went on to state that "the right to practice medicine being in
the nature of a franchise constitutes property." 4
Almost two decades later in Lira v. Lira,as the same Ohio
court agreed with the Daniels holding that a medical degree
is an asset of the marriage. However, the court went on to
state that although the degree is an asset, the license itself is
not subject to division, but rather is but one factor to con-
sider in arriving at an equitable division of the marital
estate.46
3. Kentucky
The Kentucky Court of Appeals has also differentiated
between the divisibility of a degree and a license. In Moss v.
Moss, 4 7 where a pharmacist's license was at stake, the court
said:
A degree may be a marital investment, one which is subject
to cost basis analysis. A license, however, is an illusory as-
set, one which represents merely a potential for increased
earnings. The license is no more and no less than the au-
thorized right to engage in the profession selected. To say
the license has no value obviously would be wrong, but it is
just as obvious that such value is only intrinsic and intangi-
42. Id. at , 185 N.E.2d at 774. The court also noted that at the time of trial the
parties' daughter had a heart condition and that they had accumulated no assets. Id.
43. Id. at _ 185 N.E.2d at 776. Ohio's statute provides for two types of alimony:
alimony constituting a division of marital assets and liabilities, and alimony consist-
ig of periodic payments for sustenance and support. OmIo REv. CODE ANN.
§ 3105.18 (Page 1980). See also Cherry v. Cherry, 66 Ohio St. 2d 348, 421 N.E.2d
1293 (1981) (discussing the Ohio alimony statute).
44. Daniels, 20 Ohio App. 2d at - 185 N.E.2d at 775.
45. 68 Ohio App. 2d 164, 428 N.E.2d 445 (1980).
46. Id. at _, 428 N.E.2d at 448.
47. 639 S.W.2d 370 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982).
1983]
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ble and not equatable with dollar amounts as are things of
extrinsic and tangible value.48
Confusion in the Kentucky courts over the issue of
whether a license is divisible is evident throughout the
course of Inman v. Inman .49 The Inmans were married for
seventeen years, but as a result of an affluent lifestyle with
correspondingly large debts, the net worth of their marital
estate was reduced to practically nothing.50 The wife had
been teaching school during most of the marriage while the
husband went to dental school and established his practice.
In 1979 the Kentucky Court of Appeals ruled that the
husband's license to practice dentistry was divisible marital
property and that the wife should be compensated for the
husband's increased earning capacity.5' On a second appeal
the court reversed its decision. It rejected the increased
earning capacity concept and ruled that the wife should only
be reimbursed for the amounts she spent to put her husband
through school plus interest. 3
Finally, the Supreme Court of Kentucky, relying on the
law of the case doctrine,5 4 precluded the Kentucky appellate
court from reversing itself on the issue of whether a profes-
sional license obtained during the marriage is a divisible
marital asset. However, the supreme court stated that if
the issue were before its forum, it could not accept the prop-
osition that an educational degree obtained by one spouse is
48. Id. at 374.
49. 578 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); 8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2329 (Ky. Ct.
App. Mar. 12, 1982) (second appeal); 9 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2131 (Ky. Sup. Ct. Nov.
I1, 1982). See also Comment, Property Division - License to Practice Dentistry is
Marital Property Subject to Division, 17 J. FAM. L. 826 (1979); Note, 7 N. Ky. L. REv.
143 (1980).
50. 578 S.W.2d at 267.
51. Id. at 268.
52. 8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2329 (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 12, 1982).
53. Id.
54. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 798 (5th ed. 1979), defines "law of the case" as:
the principle that if an appellate court has passed on a legal question and re-
manded the cause to the court below for further proceedings, the legal ques-
tion thus determined by the appellate court will not be differently determined
on a subsequent appeal in the same case where the facts remain the same.
55. 9 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2131, 2131 (Ky. Sup. Ct. Nov. 11, 1982).
[Vol. 66:495
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marital property even though the other spouse contributed
financially to its cost.5 6
Before the final resolution in Inman, the Kentucky Court
of Appeals had indicated in Leveck v. Leveck 57 that when
there are sufficient other assets to distribute or when mainte-
nance is warranted, it is preferable to use these means to
compensate the spouse. In Leveck, where the wife worked
as a nurse to put the husband through medical school, the
court was able to award her $10,000 in a lump sum in partial
repayment for her contributions. 8 In contrast to Inman,
where there were no assets, the court explained that: "In this
case, an equitable result was able to be reached without
treatment of the license as marital property, because Judith
was entitled to maintenance. The trial court was not clearly
erroneous in failing to find the medical license as marital
property. ' 59
4. Colorado and Illinois
Horstmann, Daniels and the first Inman appeal held that
an education is distributable either as property or as future
earning power. In In re Marriage of Graham60 the Colorado
Supreme Court rejected these theories in concluding that a
degree is not property.6 ' Many subsequent decisions in
other jurisdictions62 have relied on the Graham court's ra-
tionale which stated:
An educational degree ... is simply not encompassed
even by the broad views of the concept of "property." It
does not have an exchange value or any objective transfer-
able value on an open market. It is personal to the holder.
It terminates on death of the holder and is not inheritable.
It cannot be assigned, sold, transferred, conveyed, or pledg-
56. Id. at 2133.
57. 614 S.W.2d 710 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
58. Id. at 712.
59. Id.
60. 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978). See also Note, Graduate Degree Rejected
as Marital Property Subject to Division upon Divorce, 11 CONN. L. REv. 62 (1978);
Note, Education Acquired During Marriage - For Richer or Poorer, 12 J. MAR. J.
PRAC. & PROC. 709 (1979); Recent Development, Domestic Relations - Educational
Degree Does Not Constitute Marital Property Subject to Division Between Spouses upon
Divorce, 13 TULSA L.J. 646 (1978).
61. Graham, 194 Colo. at _ 574 P.2d at 77.
62. See, e.g., Wisner v. Wisner, 129 Ariz. 333, _., 631 P.2d 115, 121-22 (Ct. App.
1981).
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ed. An advanced degree is a cumulative product of many
years of previous education, combined with diligence and
hard work. It may not be acquired by the mere expendi-
ture of money. It is simply an intellectual achievement that
may potentially assist in the future acquisition of property.
In our view, it has none of the attributes of property in the
usual sense of that term.63
In Graham the wife, an airline stewardess, had provided
over seventy percent of the couple's financial support during
the six-year marriage. Meanwhile, her husband earned his
bachelor of science and master of business administration
degrees, but the couple acquired no tangible assets of any
value.64 In denying a property award based on the value of
the degree, the court pointed out that some spouses who sup-
port their mates in obtaining an education are not without
remedies. If there is property, the degree of one party can be
a consideration for a larger award to the other party or it can
be used as a factor in setting maintenance.65 Unfortunately,
Mrs. Graham had not sought maintenance, and because she
had proved herself to be capable of self support, she proba-
bly would not have been awarded any. Also, because she
had spent her money on her husband's education instead of
on tangible assets, no property could be awarded to her.66
Illinois followed the lead of Colorado in In re Marriage
of Goldstein,67 where the court of appeals decided that earn-
ing potential was too speculative to be the basis for a prop-
erty award.68 In this case the parties had only been married
for fifteen months and the schoolteacher wife had only sup-
ported the husband through his last year of osteopathy
school.69
5. New York and Indiana
The highest New York court to consider the issue of the
divisibility of a degree also concluded that an advanced edu-
63. Graham, 194 Colo. at , 574 P.2d at 77.
64. Id. at . 574 P.2d at 76.
65. Id. at , 574 P.2d at 78.
66. Id. at , 574 P.2d at 77.
67. 97 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 423 N.E.2d 1201 (1981).
68. Id. at , 423 N.E.2d at 1204.
69. Id. at , 423 N.E.2d at 1202.
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cation, professional license or enhanced earning power is not
subject to equitable distribution." In Lesman v. Lesman7 1
the wife worked for only one year while her husband re-
ceived his medical training. She was awarded "substantial"
support for herself and their two children, but no interest in
the degree.72
Criticizing the Kentucky courts for classifying the degree
as property in the case of the needy wife and not in the case
of the self supporting wife, the New York court pointed out
that every marriage which ends in divorce ends in disap-
pointment of expectations - financial as well as nonfinan-
cial.73 Thus, when the parties formulate a joint plan to
sacrifice for the education of one of them for the sake of fu-
ture benefits, the court need not grant the supporting party
restitution based on future earnings unless the legislature so
decrees.74
New York's equitable distribution statute explicitly states
that "any equitable claim to, interest in, or direct or indirect
contribution made . . . to the career or career potential of
the other spouse," shall be included in equitable distribu-
tion.75 But where there is no marital estate, there is little to
consider. Indiana has gone one step further to provide for
the situation in which maintenance is not warranted and
there are no assets. Indiana's law provides that courts may
reimburse the spouse who contributed to the other's educa-
tion.76 This statute was passed after decisions in In re Mar-
riage of McManama77 and Wilcox v. Wilcox78 in which
70. It should be noted that lower courts in New York are split on the issue of
whether the degree is divisible property. See Kutanovski v. Kutanovski, 8 FAM. L.
REP. (BNA) 2692 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 25, 1982); O'Brien v. O'Brien, 114 Misc. 2d 233,
452 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1982); Barton v. Barton, 8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2453 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. May 20, 1982) (all holding that a degree or license is property or that the fruits of
the license are distributable assets). Contra Conner v. Conner, 8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA)
2682 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 31, 1982); Litman v. Litman, 115 Misc. 2d 230, 453
N.Y.S.2d 1003 (1982) (both holding that a degree or license or future earning power is
not subject to equitable distribution).
71. 114 Misc. 2d 864, 452 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1982).
72. Id. at , 452 N.Y.S.2d at 939.
73. Id.
74. Id. at , 452 N.Y.S.2d at 940.
75. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(d)(6) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
76. IND. CODE §31-1-11.5-11(b) (1981).
77. 399 N.E.2d 371 (Ind. 1980).
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husbands had obtained advanced degrees while their wives
supported them. At the end of the marriages neither couple
had any assets and under Indiana law only a party who is
physically or mentally incapacitated could receive mainte-
nance.79 The new statute provides a remedy in such a
situation.
6. Remedies in New Jersey and Other States
The remaining equitable distribution states in which a
degree has been at issue in a divorce have pursued a middle
course under which they do not identify a degree or in-
creased earning power as "property," but do fashion a rem-
edy for the supporting spouse. However, these courts differ
as to whether to repay the supporting spouse for monies ex-
pended or to attempt to allow the economically and educa-
tionally disadvantaged spouse to share in the fruits of the
other's degree.
In DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa80 the Minnesota Supreme
Court allowed restitution to the extent of actual expenses for
a spouse who had supported her husband's medical educa-
tion. By contrast, in In re Marriage of Vanet 8t the Missouri
appellate court did not discuss the cost or worth of the hus-
band's law degree but upheld an award to the wife of sev-
enty-four percent of the property as well as alimony and
child support. The court explained that this judgment was
not predicated on future earnings so much as on contribu-
tions by the wife and the needs of the children. 82 Decisions
in Michigan8 3 and Nebraska 84 have awarded alimony in
78. 173 Ind. App. 661, 365 N.E.2d 792 (1977).
79. IND. CODE §§ 31-1-11.5-9(c), 31-1-11.5-11 (1976); 33-1-11.5-11 (Supp. 1979).
80. 309 N.W.2d 755 (Minn. 1981). See also Note, Disposition of Professional De-
gree upon Marriage Dissolution: DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, 66 MINN. L. REv. 1205
(1982).
81. 544 S.W.2d 236 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
82. Id. at 241. Cf. Hegge v. Hegge, 236 N.W.2d 910 (N.D. 1975). In this case the
court did not reach the question of whether an alimony award was warranted because
the wife had allegedly contributed to the attainment of the husband's master's degree.
The facts showed that her contribution consisted of a sales clerk job during one
Christmas season and that this was more than offset by her misconduct in other spher-
es. Id. at 917.
83. Moss v. Moss, 80 Mich. App. 693, 264 N.W.2d 97 (1978). See also Lombard,
Family Law, 25 WAYNE L. REV. 519, 523-24 (1979); Schwartz, Divorce and Earning
Ability, 1982 DET. C.L. REv. 69, 78.
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gross8 5 to women who supported their husbands through
professional school. Oklahoma allows a similar award of al-
imony in lieu of property. 6 In Hubbard v. Hubbard7 the
supreme court of that state also premised the payment of
$100,000 to the wife on theories of unjust enrichment and
reimbursement.88
In a trilogy of cases decided in 1982, the New Jersey
Supreme Court attempted to bring order out of the doctrinal
chaos in other states and in lower courts in its own state8 9
and to set forth guidelines for how a degree is to be treated
upon the dissolution of a marriage. In Mahoney v. Maho-
ney9" the court approved reimbursement for a wife who sup-
ported her husband while he earned an M.B.A. degree at the
Wharton School of Business Administration.91 The court
was careful to state that a degree or enhanced earning capac-
ity is not property and is not subject to equitable distribution
and that to base an award on future earnings would be too
84. Wheeler v. Wheeler, 193 Neb. 615, 228 N.W.2d 594 (1975); Magruder v. Ma-
gruder, 190 Neb. 573, 209 N.W.2d 585 (1973); Loukota v. Loukota, 177 Neb. 355, 128
N.W.2d 809 (1964); Prosser v. Prosser, 156 Neb. 629, 57 N.W.2d 173 (1953). See also
Van Pelt, No Fault Divorce: A Re-examination ofNebraska Law, 54 NEB. L. REV. 27,
34-36 (1975); Note, 7 CREIGHTON L. REV. 369 (1974); Note, Alimony Awards Under
No Fault Statutes, 53 NEB. L. REv. 126 (1974).
85. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 67 (5th ed. 1979), defines "alimony in gross" as:
[11n the nature of a final property settlement, and hence in some jurisdictions is
not included in the term "alimony," which in its strict or technical sense con-
templates money payments at regular intervals. Refers to those alimony ar-
rangements where entire award is a vested and determined amount and not
subject to change.
86. See Diment v. Diment, 531 P.2d 1071, 1074 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974).
87. 603 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1979). See also Kenderdine, Contributions to Spouse's
Education: The Searchfor Compensation When the Marriage Ends, 5 OKLA. L. REV.
409 (1980); Note, Domestic Relations: Recognition of Wffe's Interest in Professional
Degree Earned by Husband During Marriage - Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747
(Okla. 1979), 7 U. DAYTON L. REV. 183 (1981).
88. Hubbard, 603 P.2d at 752.
89. Lynn v. Lynn, 91 N.J. 510, 453 A.2d 539 (1982); Hill v. Hill, 91 N.J. 506, 453
A.2d 537 (1982); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982). See DiLeo
& Model, A Survey of the Law of Property Disposition upon Divorce in the Tristate
Area, 56 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 219, 242-45 (1982); Model & DiLeo, The New Jersey
Influence on New York's Equitable Distribution Law, 12 SETON HALL L. REv. 37, 51-
53 (1981); Survey, Domestic Relations, 13 SETON HALL L. REV. 207 (1982). These
articles describe the differing dispositions of these three cases in the lower courts of
New Jersey.
90. 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982).
91. Id. at _ 453 A.2d at 529-30.
19831
MAlRQ UETTE LAW REVIEW
speculative. It said that "[o]nce a degree candidate has
earned his or her degree, the amount that a spouse - or
anyone else - paid towards its attainment has no bearing
whatever on its value. The cost of a spouse's financial con-
tributions has no logical connection to the value of that de-
gree."92 Thus, the court concluded that the basis for the
award was not equitable distribution but reimbursement.93
The court warned that it would not support reimburse-
ment between former spouses in alimony proceedings as a
general principle.94 But in the case where one spouse has
supported the other and foregone a higher standard of living
it would be "patently unfair that the supporting spouse be
denied the mutually anticipated benefit while the supported
spouse keeps not only the degree, but also all of the financial
and material rewards flowing from it."9 5 The court sug-
gested that remedies could include reimbursement, rehabili-
tative maintenance, permanent alimony or an adjusted
property division if there were sufficient assets.96 The jus-
tices recognized that no one formula will cover every situa-
tion and that each case should be considered on its own
facts. Thus, in the companion case of Hill v. Hill,97 where
the wife had interrupted her own education to put her hus-
band through dental school, the court applied the Mahoney
criteria to suggest that either rehabilitative or reimbursement
alimony might be in order.98
In the third case, Lynn v. Lynn," the need for relief was
more urgent. The court stated:
This court can hardly envision a marriage leaving the
two parties in more divergent financial situations. At the
time of their marriage, Robert and Bonnie Lynn were
young college graduates who looked forward to advanced
degrees and promising careers. By the ltime of trial nine
years later, however, the plaintiff was a physician in private
92. Id. at . 453 A.2d at 533.
93. Id.
94. Id. at - 453 A.2d at 533.
95. Id. at . 453 A.2d at 533-34.
96. Id. at , 453 A.2d at 535.
97. 91 N.J. 506, 453 A.2d 537 (1982).
98. Id. at _ 453 A.2d at 538.
99. 91 N.J. 510, 453 A.2d 539 (1982).
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practice while his former wife had no graduate degree and
was living on social security disability pay. 0
The year the husband graduated from medical school the
wife who had been supporting him developed an incurable
inner ear disease which resulted in permanent hearing loss,
nausea and vertigo.' 0' After the trial court entered a judg-
ment granting the wife $61,377 in distribution on the theory
that the degree was property, the husband attempted to insti-
tute bankruptcy proceedings and to discharge the equitable
distribution award and the $28,525 he was ordered to pay for
the wife's attorney fees. 0 2 Based on Mahoney, the supreme
court said that the degree was not property, but remanded
the case to the trial court to set a lump sum award of reim-
bursement alimony and a separate continuing support ali-
mony. The court directed that expert testimony concerning
the value of the degree would not be necessary, but that the
wife should produce testimony regarding the ability of the
husband to pay. °3
C. Wisconsin
1. De Witt v. DeWitt
Wisconsin is an equitable distribution state' °4 which has
three reported cases dealing with the issue of how to com-
pensate the supporting spouse pursuant to a divorce. 0 5 In
DeWitt v. DeWitt 0 6 the court of appeals held that neither
the legal education of the husband nor his increased earning
capacity could be considered an asset of the marital estate
subject to division. In DeWitt the wife had discontinued her
college education so that her husband could finish his under-
graduate and legal education. She held numerous full and
part time jobs to finance his education and to support them
and their only child. After the husband obtained his law
degree, she resumed her education on a part-time basis and
100. Id. at . 453 A.2d at 542.
101. Id. at_, 453 A.2d at 540.
102. Id. at _, 453 A.2d at 541.
103. Id. at _, 453 A.2d at 543.
104. See supra note 8. See also Wis. STAT. § 767.255 (1981-1982).
105. Roberto v. Brown, 107 Wis. 2d 17, 318 N.W.2d 358 (1982); Lundberg v.
Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d 1, 318 N.W.2d 918 (1982); DeWitt v. DeWitt, 98 Wis. 2d 44,
296 N.W.2d 761 (Ct. App. 1980).
106. 98 Wis. 2d 44, 296 N.W.2d 761 (Ct. App. 1980).
1983]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
completed an associate degree in accounting.107 The De Witt
court stated that although "equity compels some sort of re-
muneration for a spouse whose contribution to the marriage
have significantly exceeded those of the mate . . . equity is
[not] served by attempting to place a dollar value on some-
thing so intangible as a professional education, degree, or
license."108 The court of appeals rejected the trial court's
valuation based on the "cost approach," which presumes
that the value of the degree is the amount of money spent
obtaining it.'0 9 According to the court,
[Such a method] fails to consider the scholastic efforts and
acumen of the degree holder, which may well have a bear-
ing on the income-yielding potential of the education. It
treats the parties as though they were strictly business part-
ners, one of whom has made a calculated investment in the
commodity of the other's professional training, expecting a
dollar for dollar return."10
The court went on to characterize methods used in other
jurisdictions to value a professional education as being
"wholly speculative.""' The court reasoned that the holder
of the degree "may choose not to practice it, may fail at it, or
may practice in a specialty, location or manner which gener-
ates less than the average income enjoyed by fellow profes-
sionals."' 12 The court also pointed out that a division based
on valuation involves a division of postdivorce earnings
which is precluded by Wisconsin law." 3 Although the court
concluded that the trial court erred in valuing Mr. DeWitt's
law degree as an asset of the marital estate,' 14 it did say that
on remand the wife's contributions should serve as a consid-
eration in determining the property division and whether al-
imony would be appropriate.1 5
107. Id. at 46-47, 296 N.W.2d at 763.
108. Id. at 56-57, 296 N.W.2d at 767.
109. Id. at 57, 296 N.W.2d at 767.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 58, 296 N.W.2d at 768.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 59, 296 N.W.2d at 768.
114. Id. at 60, 296 N.W.2d at 769.
115. Id. See Lacey v. Lacey, 45 Wis. 2d 378, 173 N.W.2d 142 (1970 (listing the
criteria suggested by the DeWitt court).
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2. Lundberg v. Lundberg
Three years later the Wisconsin Supreme Court ad-
dressed the valuation of a degree issue in two cases" 16 which
arose under the 1977 Divorce Reform Act." 7 In Lundberg v.
Lundberg" '8 the court reversed the court of appeals and up-
held a trial court award of $25,000 to the wife as compensa-
tion for the contribution she had made to her ex-husband's
medical education.
At the outset in Lundberg the supreme court noted that
no clear trend was evident from similar cases in other juris-
dictions.' 9 The court then engaged in an in depth analysis
of the 1977 Wisconsin Divorce Reform Act, which was not
in effect at the inception of the DeWitt case.' 20 The court
determined that in amending these statutes, the legislature
made clear its intent that "a spouse who has been handi-
capped socially and economically by his or her contributions
to a marriage shall be compensated for such contributions at
the termination of the marriage.' 2'
The parties, David and Judy Lundberg, were married in
1970. In the fall of 1972 David began his medical education
at the Mayo Medical School in Rochester, Minnesota. Judy
provided for the couple's financial support by teaching in a
high school, gardening, canning and keeping chickens. Af-
ter his graduation, David began a three-year residency
which he had almost completed at the time the divorce ac-
tion was commenced. 22
At trial, Judy requested compensation for supporting her
husband while he attended medical school. She used an
economist to establish the value of her investment in David's
medical degree. The expert's first method calculated the
present value of her husband's future earnings. He deter-
116. Roberto v. Brown, 107 Wis. 2d 17, 318 N.W.2d 358 (1982); Lundberg v.
Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d 1, 318 N.W.2d 918 (1982).
117. Divorce Reform Act, ch. 105, 1977 Wis. Laws 560.
118. 107 Wis. 2d 1, 14-15, 318 N.W.2d 918, 924 (1982).
119. Id. at 8, 318 N.W.2d at 921.
120. Id. at 9-14, 318 N.W.2d at 922-24. DeWitt was decided under Wis. STAT.
ch. 247 (1975); Lundberg was decided under Wis. STAT. ch. 247 (1977).
121. Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d at 10, 318 N.W.2d at 924 (quoting Divorce Reform
Act, ch. 105, § 1, 1977 Wis. Laws 560, 560-61).
122. Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d at 3-5, 318 N.W.2d at 919.
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mined this amount to be between $110,800 and $132,000.123
The second method measured Judy's actual expenditures.
Using a cost-plus-interest analysis, the economist figured the
amount to be $33,077.124 At trial Judy testified that she esti-
mated the cost of her support to be $25,000 and requested
that amount.1 25 The trial court found that Judy had sup-
ported both of them during David's years in medical school
and had also provided substantial emotional support and
performed virtually all of the household tasks.' 26  It there-
fore awarded Judy the $25,000 without denominating the
compensation as either property division or maintenance. 127
The court of appeals reversed, finding no legal basis for
the award.128 Relying on DeWitt, it said that the $25,000
could not be classified as a property division. 29 It also con-
cluded that it was not proper to award Judy a return on her
investment in David's medical degree, inasmuch as DeWitt
had disapproved of the approach taken by some jurisdictions
which allowed the supporting spouse to recover the monies
expended on the student spouse.' 30  Moreover, the $25,000
exceeded the total value of the parties' assets and could only
be satisfied out of postdivorce earnings - a result also not
approved in DeWitt.13 1
123. Id. at 5, 318 N.W.2d at 920. This method took into account the difference
between the average earnings of family practitioners and the average earnings of
white males with five or more years of college education. Calculating this amount
over a 25-year working period, the sum was then reduced to present value using both
a 10% and 12% discount rate.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 6, 318 N.W.2d at 920. David estimated that her contributions had
been worth $20,207.39, and was willing to pay her that amount. Id.
126. Id. at 4-5, 318 N.W.2d at 920.
127. Id. at 6, 318 N.W.2d at 920.
128. Lundberg v. Lundberg, 103 Wis. 2d 689, 309 N.W.2d 889 (1981) (the memo-
randum decision of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals is unpublished).
129. Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d at 6, 318 N.W.2d at 920.
130. Id. at 6, 318 N.W.2d at 920-21.
131. Id. See Balaam v. Balaam, 52 Wis. 2d 20, 28, 187 N.W.2d 867, 872 (1971)
(quoting with approval Conrad v. Conrad, 252 N.C. 412, -, 113 S.E.2d 912, 916
(1960)) ("The award should be based on the amount which defendant is earning when
alimony is sought and the award made ...."). See also. Whitwam v. Whitwam, 87
Wis. 2d 22, 35, 273 N.W.2d 366, 372 (1978) ("A family trial court has authority to
divide and distribute the real estate owned by the parties on the date of the divorce.
This authority does not extend to disposing of or limiting the parties from disposing
of real property acquired after the divorce judgment."); Bussewitz v. Bussewitz, 75
Wis. 2d 78, 82-83, 248 N.W.2d 417, 420 (1977) ("A property division is the fair, equi-
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The supreme court reversed and upheld the $25,000
award although, like the trial court, it did not label the
award as being either maintenance or a property division. 132
Unable to rely on the conflicting results in other jurisdic-
tions, the Lundberg court invoked the equity powers of the
family court and found legislative authority "to compensate
a spouse in cases of this kind."1 33
In 1977 the legislature made numerous changes to the
Wisconsin divorce statutes. In amending these statutes the
legislature set forth a presumption that the marital estate
should be divided equally, but that the spouse who has made
social and economic sacrifices for the benefit of the other
should be compensated. 34  This compensation can be
achieved through both property division and maintenance
payments. 35 The 1977 amendment to section 247.255 136 al-
lows a court to award more than one-half of the marital
property to one of the parties after considering a number of
factors. In Lundberg the court focused on subsection (5) of
this property division statute which allows a court to con-
table and just division of the marital estate, or assets of the parties as they exist at the
time of the divorce. That is, the assets which the parties brought into the marriage
and or acquired during the marriage.").
132. Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d at 14, 318 N.W.2d at 924.
133. Id. at 9, 318 N.W.2d at 922.
134. Id. at 10, 318 N.W.2d at 922.
135. Id.
136. Divorce Reform Act, ch. 105, § 41, 1977 Wis. Laws 560, 571-72 (current
version at Wis. STAT. § 767.255 (1981-1982)). The current statute provides:
Property division. Upon every judgment of annulment, divorce or legal sepa-
ration, or in rendering a judgment in an action under s. 767.02 (1) (h), the
court shall divide the property of the parties and divest and transfer the title of
any such property accordingly. A certified copy of the portion of the judgment
which affects title to real estate shall be recorded in the office of the register of
deeds of the county in which the lands so affected are situated. The court may
protect and promote the best interests of the children by setting aside a portion
of the property of the parties in a separate fund or trust for the support, main-
tenance, education and general welfare of any minor children of the parties.
Any property shown to have been acquired by either party prior to or during
the course of the marriage as a gift, bequest, devise or inheritance or to have
been paid for by either party with funds so acquired shall remain the property
of such party and may not be subjected to a property division under this sec-
tion except upon a finding that refusal to divide such property will create a
hardship on the other party or on the children of the marriage, and in that
event the court may divest the party of such property in a fair and equitable
manner. The court shall presume that all other property is to be divided
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sider "the contribution by one party to the education, train-
ing or increased earning power of the other."' 137
The Lundberg court also analyzed the change in the Wis-
consin maintenance statute 38 which sets forth factors for the
trial court to consider in making such an award. The nature
of these factors persuaded the court that maintenance was no
equally between the parties, but may alter this distribution without regard to
marital misconduct after considering:
(1) The length of the marriage.
(2) The property brought to the marriage by each party.
(2r) Whether one of the parties has substantial assets not subject to divi-
sion by the court.
(3) The contribution of each party to the marriage, giving appropriate
economic value to each party's contribution in homemaking and child care
services.
(4) The age and physical and emotional health of the parties.
(5) The contribution by one party to the education, training or increased
earning power of the other.
(6) The earning capacity of each party, including educational back-
ground, training, employment skills, work experience, length of absence from
the job market, custodial responsibilities for children and the time and expense
necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party to be-
come self-supporting at a standard of living reasonably comparable to that
enjoyed during the marriage.
(7) The desirability of awarding the family home or the right to live
therein for a reasonable period to the party having custody of any children.
(8) The amount and duration of an order under s. 767.26 granting main-
tenance payments to either party, any order for periodic family support pay-
ments under s. 767.261 and whether the property division is in lieu of such
payments.
(9) Other economic circumstances of each party, including pension bene-
fits, vested or unvested, and future interests.
(10) The tax consequences to each party.
(11) Any written agreement made by the parties before or during the
marriage concerning any arrangement for property distribution; such agree-
ments shall be binding upon the court except that no such agreement shall be
binding where the terms of the agreement are inequitable as to either party.
The court shall presume any such agreement to be equitable as to both parties.
(12) Such other factors as the court may in each individual case deter-
mine to be relevant.
137. Wis. STAT. § 247.255(5) (1977).
138. Divorce Reform Act, ch. 105 § 42, 1977 Wis. Laws 560, 572 (codified at Wis.
STAT. § 247.26) (current version at Wis. STAT. § 767.26 (1981-1982)). The current
statute provides:
Maintenance payments. Upon every judgment of annulment, divorce or legal
separation, or in rendering a judgment in an action under s. 767.02(l)(g) or (j),
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longer to be based solely on need.' 39 The possibility that the
party seeking maintenance can become self-supporting is
only one factor to consider in making a maintenance award.
Judy's contribution to David's education was considered
under the catch-all subsection 247.26(l)(i)140 which allows
the court to consider "such other factors as the court may
determine in each individual case to be relevant."1 4 1 Like-
wise, it indicated that maintenance can be employed for
compensation purposes even in situations where a spouse is
capable of self-support. 42  The court stated that: "When
maintenance is employed for compensation purposes, as op-
posed to purposes of support, it seems preferable to arrange
a series of payments over a fixed period."'143 In essence the
the court may grant an order requiring maintenance payments to either party
for a limited or indefinite length of time after considering:
(1) The length of the marriage.
(2) The age and physical and emotional health of the parties.
(3) The division of property made under s. 767.255.
(4) The educational level of each party at the time of marriage and at the
time the action is commenced.
(5) The earning capacity of the party seeking maintenance, including ed-
ucational background, training, employment skills, work experience, length of
absence from the job market, custodial responsibilities for children and the
time and expense necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to en-
able the party to find appropriate employment.
(6) The feasibility that the party seeking maintenance can become self-
supporting at a standard of living reasonably comparable to that enjoyed dur-
ing the marriage, and, if so, the length of time necessary to achieve this goal.
(7) The tax consequences to each party.
(8) Any mutual agreement made by the parties before or during the mar-
riage, according to the terms of which one party has made financial or service
contributions to the other with the expectation of reciprocation or other com-
pensation in the future, where such repayment has not been made, or any mu-
tual agreement made by the parties before or during the marriage concerning
any arrangement for the financial support of the parties.
(9) The contribution by one party to the education, training or increased
earning power of the other.
(10) Such other factors as the court may in each individual case deter-
mine to be relevant.
139. Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d at 12-13, 318 N.W.2d at 424. Cf. COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 14-10-114) (1973 & Supp. 1982); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 518.552 (West 1980) (both
statutes require that a maintenance award be based on need).
140. Wis. STAT. § 247.26(l)(i) (1977) (current version at Wis. STAT. § 767.26(10)
(1981-1982)).
141. Id.
142. Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d at 12, 318 N.W.2d at 923-24.
143. Id. at 14, 318 N.W.2d at 924.
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court appears to be saying that a lump sum award payable in
the form of maintenance or property division is appropriate
in circumstances such as these. The court reasoned that
"[this allows both parties to plan their financial matters and
allows a spouse to be reimbursed for his or her contributions
within a reasonable period of time."' 144
Although the property division statute 45 also allows the
court to consider the contributions by one party to the sup-
port of the other, the court did not treat David's medical de-
gree or enhanced earning potential as a divisible marital
asset. Instead, it framed the issue as whether to compensate
Judy for her contributions to David's degree. 46 In this case
reimbursement from the couple's property was not possible,
so it was done with future cash payments. Hence, the
supreme court is indicating that a trial court should look to
the circumstances of the parties and use both maintenance
and property division as flexible tools to compensate the
working spouse.
3. Roberto v. Brown
In the companion case of Roberto v. Brown 14 7 the hus-
band and wife had made roughly equal financial contribu-
tions to the marriage while the husband attended medical
school. But the wife had deferred her own career goals
working at a job that was personally distasteful to her and
moving about the country to further her husband's career
goals. 148
At the time of the divorce the couple's only divisible asset
was a house. A seventy percent share of the proceeds from
its sale was to go to the wife. This award was valued at
$10,000, which the court deemed to be inadequate compen-
sation in view of the fact that she would theoretically have
been entitled to half the proceeds even if she had not sup-
ported her husband's education. 149 Again, equity came into
play with the court stating that "it seems only fair" that a
144. Id.
145. See supra note 136.
146. Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d at 3, 318 N.W.2d at 919.
147. 107 Wis. 2d 17, 318 N.W.2d 358 (1982).
148. Id. at 18-21, 318 N.W.2d at 359.
149. Id. at 23, 318 N.W.2d at 360.
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wife who deferred her own career goals to aid her husband
substantially in the attainment of his goal should be helped
by him in return.150 The case was then remanded to the trial
court with the direction to consider an award of mainte-
nance in addition to the property settlement.' 5
III. METHODS OF VALUATION
A. As Property
In Wisconsin assets are valued as of the date the divorce
is granted. 52 If the degree is to be taken into consideration
as the asset of one spouse, some method of setting its present
value must be used.1 53 A similar situation arises when a
couple's efforts and resources are directed toward building a
business that has a potential for future remuneration. A
spouse's interest in a closely held corporation is classified as
marital property which is distributable upon divorce. 54
Courts have relied upon Revenue Ruling 59-601" for pur-
poses of valuation. Section 5(A) of that ruling states that in
150. Id. at 22, 318 N.W.2d at 360.
151. Id. at 23, 318 N.W.2d at 360.
152. See Dean v. Dean, 87 Wis. 2d 854, 871, 275 N.W.2d 902, 909 (1979); Sho-
lund v. Sholund, 34 Wis. 2d 122, 132, 148 N.W.2d 726, 731 (1967); Holbrook v. Hol-
brook, 103 Wis. 2d 327, 335, 309 N.W.2d 343, 346-49 (Ct. App. 1981). See also supra
note 125.
153. See generally Erickson, Spousal Support Toward the Realization of Educa-
tional Goals: How the Law Can Ensure Reciprocity, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 947; Kraus-
koph, Recompensefor Financing Spouse's Education: Legal Protectionfor the Marital
Investor in Human Capital, 28 KAN. L. REv. 379 (1980); Moore, Should a Professional
Degree Be Considered a Marital Asset upon Divorce? 15 AKRON L. REv. 543 (1982);
Raggio, Professional Goodwill and Professional Licenses as Property Subject to Distri-
bution upon Dissolution of Marriage, 16 FAM. L.Q. 147 (1982); Schwartz, supra note
83; Comment, Family Law: Ought a Professional Degree Be Divisible as Property upon
Divorce? 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 517 (1981) (all setting forth comparisons of vari-
ous methods for valuing a professional degree).
154. See King, Divorce Settlements: The Value of Human Capital, TRIAL, Aug.
1982, at 48-51 (analogy between a degree and an interest in a closely held
corporation).
155. Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237, as amended by Rev. Rul. 65-193, 1965-2
C.B. 370. The eight factors set forth in this ruling are: the nature of the business and
the history of the enterprise from its inception; the economic outlook in general and
the condition and outlook of the specific industry in particular; the book value of the
stock and the financial condition of the business; the earning capacity of the company;
the dividend-paying capacity; whether or not the enterprise has goodwill or other
intangible value; sales of the stock and the size of the block to be valued; and the
market price of stocks of corporations engaged in the same or similar line of business
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trying to determine the market value of the assets owned by
the corporation "earnings may be the most important crite-
rion of value."'' 56  Accordingly, the accountant or expert
evaluating the business will examine the tax returns of the
business for the past five years to determine the company's
past earnings. A capitalization factor is then used as a multi-
plier of past earnings to determine the present value. Basi-
cally, the capitalization process is a means of converting the
future income into present value. This method is similar to
using an increased earnings approach in the valuation of a
degree.157
An economist can value a professional degree by com-
paring the stream of income that a professional could expect
to earn over the remainder of his work life as compared to
the stream of income generated by a college graduate with
an undergraduate bachelor's degree who is in a related occu-
pation (for example, a doctor's income as compared to that
of a nurse). 58 After the appropriate income projections are
made and the work life is determined from expectancy ta-
bles, the value can be determined.'59 This amount equals
the difference between the present value of the professional
income and the present value of the income of the four-year
college graduate. 60
The disadvantage of classifying the professional degree
as a marital asset distributable in a property settlement is
that a property settlement is dischargeable in bankruptcy.' 6'
having their stocks actively traded in a free and open market, either on exchange or
over-the-counter.
Courts have accorded various weights to the factors depending upon the property
valued and circumstances involved. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(f) (1981).
156. Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237.
157. See Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 791, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131, 134 (1969);
Comment, The Interest of the Community in a Professional Education, 10 CAL. W.L.
REV. 590, 604-12 (1974) (formulas for determining increased earning capacity).
158. See, e.g., Lundberg v. Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d 1, 5, 318 N.W.2d 918, 920
(1982).
159. Expectancy tables are published by the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau
of Labor Statistics.
160. See Burke & Rosen, Economic Value of a Professional License, FAIRSHARE,
June 1982 at 9-12 (detailed explanation of this method of determining enhanced earn-
ing power).
161. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)(B) (Supp. V 1981). See also Usher v. Usher, 442 F.
Supp. 866 (N.D. Ga. 1977) (discussing the argument that because "lump sum ali-
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Also, a property division is final and is not subject to revi-
sion or modification based upon a change of circum-
stances. 162  Finally, it may be argued that the valuation
method just suggested is too speculative and involves merely
a possibility of increased earning capacity and thus involves
postdivorce earnings.' 63
B. As Maintenance
In Wisconsin the present maintenance statute'6 does not
distinguish among different types of alimony. Lundberg
165
seems to indicate that a lump sum maintenance award with
payments spread over a fixed period of time is acceptable
when maintenance is employed for compensation pur-
poses.' 66 This language also indicates that the type of peri-
odic payment specified in sections 71 and 215 of the Internal
Revenue Code' 67 could be made. Section 71 refers to "peri-
odic payments" and is only applicable to payments intended
as support, not to installment payments for property divi-
sion. 168 This term does not have an equivalent in state law
and is a device used to reduce the tax impact of a divorce
settlement. The payments can be made for a property settle-
ment, in which case they are nondeductible by the payor, or
they can be made for spousal support, in which case they are
includable as income to the payee and deductible by the
payor under section 215 of the Internal Revenue Code. 169
The language in section 71 referring to "periodic payments"
is similar to the language in Lundberg which states that in
order to fairly compensate the supporting spouse the court
mony" may not be treated as alimony for federal income tax purposes, such an obli-
gation may not be alimony and thus is dischargeable in bankruptcy).
162. Wis. STAT. § 767.32 (1981-1982).
163. DeWitt v. DeWitt, 98 Wis. 2d 44, 53-63, 296 N.W.2d 761, 765-70 (Ct. App.
1980) (where the court agreed with these arguments).
164. Wis. STAT. § 767.26 (1981-1982). See supra note 138.
165. Lundberg v. Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d 1, 318 S.W.2d 918 (1982).
166. Id. at 14-15, 318 N.W.2d at 924.
167. I.R.C. §§ 71, 215 (1976).
168. I.R.C. § 71(c)(1) (1976). "For purposes of subsection (a), installment pay-
ments discharging a part of an obligation the principal sum of which is, either in
terms of money or property, specified in the decree, instrument, or agreement shall
not be treated as periodic payments.").
169. I.R.C. § 215(a) (1976).
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may employ maintenance, property division or a combina-
tion of the two.' 70
The advantage of a maintenance award is that it is non-
dischargeable in bankruptcy.' 7 ' However, a maintenance
award is subject to revision and modification upon a change
of circumstances. 7 2 Another problem with maintenance is
that it is not an entitlement but an award within the court's
discretion which can terminate upon a spouse's remar-
riage. 73 In addition, Wisconsin, in effect, no longer has lim-
ited term maintenance. Dixon v. Dixon 174 states that the trial
court has the power to revise or alter the judgment respect-
ing the amount of limited maintenance or its duration pro-
vided that the petition to revise the payments is filed prior to
the termination date of the limited maintenance as set forth
in the judgment. 75 Again, if a periodic payment is used pur-
suant to section 71, it is to be of a calculable amount which
means a fixed term payment. 7 6 Thus, the court would have
to award a lump sum to the supporting spouse over a fixed
period of time in installments.
Another disadvantage of a maintenance award made
pursuant to Wisconsin Statute section 767.26177 is that it is a
device to be used to allow the party seeking relief to enjoy a
standard of living comparable to that enjoyed during the
marriage. Yet in the typical fact pattern under discussion,
the parties have forfeited a higher standard of living during
the marriage in order to devote their resources to the attain-
ment of a professional degree. Hence, this award cannot be
made in reference to the standard of living the party with the
advanced degree is able to maintain in the future.
C As a Specific Type of Alimony
As noted previously, Wisconsin's maintenance statute
170. Compare I.R.C. § 71 (1976) with Lundberg v. Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d 1, 15,
318 N.W.2d 918, 924 (1982).
171. See supra note 161.
172. Wis. STAT. § 767.32 (1981-1982).
173. Id. § 767.32(3). See also Van Gorder v. Van Gorder, 110 Wis. 2d 188, 327
N.W.2d 674 (1983) (cohabitation of the maintenance receiving spouse with another
person can be a factor in revising or terminating maintenance payments).
174. 107 Wis. 2d 492, 319 N.W.2d 846 (1982).
175. Id. at 506-08, 319 N.W.2d at 853-54.
176. I.R.C. § 71(c)(1) (1976).
177. Wis. STAT. § 767.26 (1981-1982).
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does not differentiate among different types of alimony.17 8
Some jurisdictions, however, have carved out and labeled
specific awards to be made.179 This is done so that an award
denominated as "reimbursement alimony" or "rehabilitative
alimony" cannot be terminated by contingencies, such as re-
marriage, which are set forth under a state's statutory
scheme.18 0 This is the stance the New Jersey Supreme Court
took in Mahoney v. Mahoney,1 8 1 where the court stated:
There will be circumstances where a supporting spouse
should be reimbursed for the financial contributions he or
she made to the spouse's successful professional training.
Such reimbursement alimony should cover all financial
contributions towards the former spouse's education, in-
cluding household expenses, educational costs, school
travel expenses and any other contributions used by the
supported spouse in obtaining his or her degree or
license. 82
The court then went on to set forth a caveat for using reim-
bursement alimony:
[O]nly monetary contributions made with the mutual and
shared expectation that both parties to the marriage will
derive increased income and material benefits should be a
basis for such an award. For example, it is unlikely that a
financially successful executive's spouse, who, after many
years of homemaking, returns to school would upon di-
vorce be required to reimburse her husband for his contri-
butions toward her degree. 83
The Mahoney court also stated that an award of reimburse-
ment alimony does not involve any consideration of the eco-
nomic value of the professional degree.18"
At the time of the divorce in Hill v. Hill18 5 the wife was
enrolled in dental school and required the financial assist-
178. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 89-103.
180. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 767.32 (1981-1982). See also Kenderdine, supra note
87, at 426-27 n.101; Moore, supra note 153, at 550-52; Comment, supra note 153, at
603-04 (discussion of both reimbursement alimony and restitution).
181. 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982).
182. Id. at - 453 A.2d at 534.
183. Id. at , 453 A.2d at 535.
184. Id. at , 453 A.2d at 533.
185. 91 N.J. 506, 453 A.2d 537 (1982).
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ance which the husband was now able to provide. 86 The
New Jersey Supreme Court approved an award of rehabili-
tative alimony stating that "the concept of rehabilitative ali-
mony where a short-term or lump-sum award from one
party in a divorce will enable his former spouse to complete
the preparation necessary for economic self-sufficiency" was
supported by precedent. 87 Presumably, the amount of this
type of award would be based more on the cost to educate
the former supporting spouse than on the monies spent on
the former supported spouse.
In the third companion case, Lynn v. Lynn,"' where the
wife's illness rendered rehabilitative alimony useless, the
court suggested awarding two other types of relief:
[W]here the circumstances of the parties diverge greatly at
the end of a relatively short marriage, the more fortunate
spouse may fairly be called upon to accept responsibility
for the other's misfortune - the fate of their shared enter-
prise. Under the facts of this case, both an initial lump-
sum award of reimbursement alimony as described in Ma-
honey,.., and a separate continuing alimony obligation
would be appropriate.'89
D. As Restitution
In other jurisdictions maintenance statutes preclude an
award for support when a spouse is capable of self-sup-
port. 190 In these states courts have allowed the equitable
remedy of restitution to compensate the supporting spouse.
In DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa '9' the Minnesota Supreme
Court used the approach of granting restitution to the work-
ing spouse in the amount contributed by that spouse to the
education and training of the student spouse. 92 In that case,
where the working spouse had "foregone the immediate en-
joyment of earned income to enable the other to pursue an
186. Id. at _ 453 A.2d at 538-39.
187. Id. at_, 453 A.2d at 538.
188. 91 N.J. 510, 453 A.2d 539 (1982).
189. Id. at _, 453 A.2d at 542.
190. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 14-10-114 (1973 & Supp. 1982); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 518.552 (West 1980).
191. 309 N.W.2d 755 (Minn. 1981).
192. Id. at 759.
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advanced education on a full-time basis . . . [t]he equities
weigh heavily in favor of providing a remedy to the working
spouse . . ,.9. The court rejected the argument that a
remedy in circumstances such as these is limited to statuto-
rily prescribed relief in cases of marriage dissolution. It fur-
ther explained that cases considering an advanced degree or
an increase in earning capacity were "inapposite" because at
the time of the divorce Dr. DeLa Rosa had not completed
his medical training. 194 The DeLa Rosa court thus awarded
the wife the amount she had spent on her husband's educa-
tion and living expenses, but did not award her her own liv-
ing expenses.195
The restitutionary recovery in DeLa Rosa is similar to
the reimbursement type of alimony used to compensate the
supporting spouse m other jurisdictions. The award is
merely premised upon a different legal theory in order to
provide appropriate relief to the supporting spouse without
denying her a remedy under the Minnesota divorce
statutes. 1
96
Restitution is also a remedy used to prevent unjust en-
richment under the contractual principles of quasi-con-
tract. 97 Although the parties may not have mutually agreed
to invest in the husband's education, it is implied at law that
such assent existed.' 98 In order to compensate the working
spouse, a court may employ the theory of quasi-contract to
compensate the supporting spouse when a construction of its
property division and maintenance statutes prevents relief
under a jurisdiction's divorce code. The husband has re-
ceived the benefit of his wife's support, but at the expense of
his wife making career sacrifices in addition to foregoing a
higher standard of living. She has an expectation of repay-
ment which will not be fulfilled as a result of the divorce.
193. Id. at 758.
194. Id. at 758-59.
195. Id. at 759.
196. Id. at 757.
197. See 5 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 1103, 1105 (1964).
198. See Roberto v. Brown, 107 Wis. 2d 17, 20, 318 N.W.2d 358, 359 (1982).
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The amount of the recipient's benefit is ordinarily the ex-
pense or cost to the person conferring the benefit. 99
E. As a Tort Remedy
The law of torts may also provide a remedy. Although
there was no recovery for wrongful death at common law,
most jurisdictions today have some type of statutory remedy
for wrongful death.2 °° When there is an action for recovery
for wrongful death, the earning capacity of the deceased is at
issue. Since divorce is the death of a marriage, damages to
the supporting spouse could be made based on the estimated
amount of earnings over the remainder of the professional
spouse's life expectancy and awarded to the supporting
spouse as compensation.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE PARADOX
The courts continue to be presented with the problem of
compensating the spouse who has foregone personal goals, a
higher standard of living and status in order that the other
spouse can secure a professional degree. If the marriage
breaks up before the parties are fully able to benefit from the
fruits of the professional degree, the spouse with the ad-
vanced degree has the training to enable him to have an in-
creased earning capacity and enhanced status. But when the
supporting spouse fails to receive these benefits this results in
an inequitable situation upon the dissolution of the mar-
riage. The American judicial system, as well as the Wiscon-
sin Constitution, 20 ' recognizes that every wrong has a
remedy in our courts. The dilemma is how to bring about a
just resolution to this situation. The paradox is that the
court's jurisdiction is limited to dividing the marital estate of
the parties at the time of the dissolution, but the professional
degree or license is not property in the legally accepted
sense. Many jurisdictions cannot make an award of mainte-
nance since their statutory schemes do not allow such an
award in instances where the spouse is self-supporting.
199. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §§ 150-59 (1937). Accord DeLa Rosa v.
DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755, 759 (Minn. 1981).
200. See J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 5.19 (1981 & Supp. 1982).
201. WIs. CONST. art. I, § 9.
[Vol. 66:495
1983] DEGREE VALUATION IN DIVORCE 527
Likewise, maintenance is generally based upon the standard
of living during the marriage and not upon anticipated in-
creased future income. Thus, the dilemma versus the para-
dox. This situation is not unlike that of a man who makes
an agreement with a boat owner to take him and his car
across a lake in return for a promise to give the boat owner a
ride to the city upon reaching the other side. On disembark-
ing, the man refuses to take the boat owner along in his car.
The man has received his passage across the lake, but the
boat owner, relying on the man's promise, has not received
the benefits of the services he provided.
An innate sense of justice must pervade any considera-
tion of this issue of compensating a working spouse, for
there must be some remedy for the wrong. The theory of
recovery may vary, but the theme appears to be constant,
pointing in the direction of recompense.

